One of the crew on the voyage to Brisbane claimed the seas encountered were ‘mountainous’ and the weather on the night of 18 April was the ‘worst in his experience’. Silver Cloud III came through the gale with ‘flying colours’ having suffered a little superficial damage by the exceptionally heavy sea. The gale delayed all coastal shipping.
Having heard nothing regarding compensation, Bruce wrote again on 8 October 1941, reiterating his previous queries and putting forward an offer to sell the vessel for £5,100. He advised he had obtained an independent certificate of valuation of £5,500 which he could produce if required. The response was the same as before, indicating that purchase or hire was ‘under consideration’. The Director of Engineering (Naval) recommended purchase for £4,000.
In November 1941, Muirhead-Gould recommended she be allocated to Port Moresby with Seamist. The Naval Board agreed and directed that both vessels be ‘metal sheathed’ for protection in the tropical waters. Muirhead-Gould advised the Board both vessels were suitable for ASDIC.
With no response from the Navy, Bruce engaged solicitors who wrote to the Naval Board in December. His solicitor, Mr Manion, claimed their client was not receiving the ‘reasonable consideration that might have been expected’ and that Bruce could not ‘allow the present position to remain in abeyance any longer’. The solicitor advised the Naval Board that their officer had omitted to comply with the regulations to notify Bruce of the amount of compensation at the time of requisition so he could take the ‘necessary steps to safeguard his rights’. It was suggested the matter be promptly remedied given the Board’s attention had been drawn to the ‘injustice under which our Client has unduly been suffering’. At the time, neither Bruce nor his solicitors would have known the matter of compensation was to continue for another two years.
In mid-December 1941, the Board agreed with a further recommendation from Muirhead-Gould that Esmeralda should be allocated to Port Moresby in lieu of Silver Cloud, due to her better ventilation and long range. The same month, without finalizing the charter or purchase arrangements, the Board agreed Bruce would be paid a rate for charter to be determined by a Naval Charter Rates Board set up under the National Security Regulations.
A meeting was held on 30 December 1941 with Bruce, Mannion, the Business Member of the Naval Board and Mr Tennant representing the Commonwealth. Manion advised Bruce had revised his valuation to £5,500 plus special damages of £500 for compensation for depriving him of his place of residence. Bruce reiterated he had only been in possession of the vessel for 14 months prior to its requisition. Tennant put that a depreciation rate of 12½% for the first year and 10% for the following years would apply to a ‘non-utilitarian’ vessel. The submission was strongly opposed by Manion who claimed the vessel had been extremely well looked after as Bruce had always been in residence, and it had been on the slips regularly every two to three months. Manion asked the Commonwealth to make an offer. In response, the Commonwealth informed Manion and Bruce, that the difference between the parties was so wide ‘it would be of no value to name a figure’. The ‘interview’ closed on a ‘note of dissatisfaction sounded by Manion that no figure was put by the Commonwealth’.
A week later, Bruce was served with an ‘Impressment Order’ which contained a value of £4,000 - for the Navy to take his loved Silver Cloud and his home. The following week, Manion responded to the Naval Board with a formal notice requiring the value to be determined by a Compensation Board. In a covering letter, Manion included, ‘In these times our Client, indeed, most reputable people, do not look for or expect anything in the shape of profit by reason of the deprivation of property but they are of the opinion, as the Commonwealth has rightly determined, that the method of the assessment of compensation is as fixed by the Statute, namely, the market value of the subject vessel as at the date of requisition.’
The Commonwealth responded advising ‘there is some doubt as to whether this notification was lodged within the prescribed period’.
Manion’s response was swift including, ‘… we propose seeing that representations are made through the proper channels to acquaint the Minister in charge with what is apparently taking place in your department, namely, an attitude utterly unfair and one which we have no doubt is entirely foreign to the intentions of the Government in regard to the treatment of people whose property the naval authorities have seen fit to appropriate’. Manion acknowledged that neither he nor Bruce questioned the Navy’s need for the vessel which quite properly required its requisition. Among other matters, Manion confirmed that Bruce, since the outbreak of the war, had been a member of the Voluntary Coastal Patrol which, and in association with the NSW Police, carried out patrol work and gave up the use of his vessel without any monetary payment whatever, and that Bruce was providing voluntary services as a member of the Films Advisory Committee to the Department of Information. Bruce clearly believed his contribution to the war effort had already been substantial.
The Commonwealth advised that ‘Bruce’s Notification’ was not received in the proper time and his right to have the amount of compensation assessed by a Compensation Board had therefore lapsed. Manion did not respond immediately and the Commonwealth put the matter of ‘finalizing the purchase’ in the hands of the Deputy Crown Solicitor. The letter was copied to Muirhead-Gould.
When Manion wrote again to the Naval Board, he included two valuations obtained by Bruce for the sums of £5,400 and £5,500. Manion also referred to ‘the particular Official who has been responsible for endeavouring to take the advantage of Mr Bruce’ and again referred to Bruce’s contribution and services to the ‘Military authorities who apparently have been pleased to accept the same … which we have no doubt will be of considerably more use to his Country than that of the Official who has been dealing with his claim’. He concluded ‘It is not too late for the decent thing still to be done’.
The Crown Solicitor considered the matter and in a pointed letter, informed the Naval Board on 6 May 1942, that the Notice issued by the Navy to Bruce was not a ‘proper notice’ with regard to permanently acquiring the vessel. The Crown Solicitor confirmed it was not possible for the Navy’s Purchasing Officer to assess the fair market value for the purpose of the ‘Impressment Order’, and the valuation of £4,000 was no more than an offer to purchase at that amount. The Crown Solicitor confirmed he had communicated with Manion who maintained the proper value was £5,500 and that Bruce had recently seen the vessel ‘in such a state and condition, that in his considered opinion, it would be practically impossible to restore it to the state and condition in which it was when taken over by the Department’.
Muirhead-Gould however, had already relied on the force of the invalid ‘Impressment Order’ and had drawn an advance of £4,000 which had been forwarded to the Crown Solicitor for the ‘final’ payment to Bruce. The Crown Solicitor returned the payment and informed the Naval Board that if any further action was required, they should instruct him accordingly. The matter of the requisition was firmly back in the hands of the Navy.
By the Battle of Sydney Harbour, the Navy had yet to complete the requisition of Silver Cloud. On 25 July 1942, a new ‘Impressment Order’ was issued requisitioning the vessel permanently. The Order included the Navy’s value of just £4,000. Bruce’s solicitor, Mr Manion, responded with a formal notice requiring the value to be determined by a Compensation Board. In his covering letter, he asked for details of the compensation the Navy would pay for the use of the vessel from the date of initial requisition to the date of the permanent requisition, especially as the Navy had ‘considerably knocked’ her about. Two days later on 17 August 1942, Manion wrote again to the Board requiring satisfactory information otherwise Bruce would be advised to ‘exercise his legal remedies’ forthwith.
By the end of the month, the Secretary of the Naval Board confirmed the compensation would be assessed by a Compensation Board.
In November, the Naval Board advised Bruce he would receive payment of £694 for the hire of Silver Cloud from the date she was ‘taken’ to the time of the Navy’s permanent requisition. Bruce was advised, the payment would reach him within a few days. As could be expected, Manion responded that until the matter of Burce’s claim for compensation in respect of the ‘deprivation of the subject vessel’ had been determined, Bruce and Manion would refrain from making any comment as to the charter rate imposed by the Navy.
The matter dragged on, and on 28 April 1943, wearied by the delay, Bruce instructed Manion to put an offer of £5,000 to settle the claim, subject to acceptance within fourteen days. The Naval Board did not accept the offer. The Navy proposed a settlement sum of £3,500 (in addition to the earlier charter payment). On 12 May, Manion accepted the Board’s offer of £3,500, ‘without prejudice’ to Bruce’s claims ‘as stated’, and requested ‘the promised cheque immediately’. On 20 May the Board acknowledged a cheque for £3,500 for ‘progress payment on account’ would be received within a few days.
Six weeks later, Silver Cloud was devastated by fire. On 12 July 1943 at 0815 (8.15 am), she was moored to a buoy in Hunters Bay off Balmoral Beach. The commander at the time, Lieutenant Gasking had just come aboard and ordered a flag to be raised directing the Fleet to prepare to slip their moorings in sequence of their Fleet numbers. He ordered her engines to be started to ‘Warm through motors’ which was passed by the Coxswain to the wheel-house. He heard the starboard engine start followed by a cry of ‘Fire in the engine room’.
Fire stations were immediately ordered. Gasking proceeded into the wheel-house and from there to the engine room where he heard the mechanic cry, ‘look out for the gas’ and immediately caught the mechanic who was falling backward, having been overcome by the fumes. Griffin said he observed the port motor was burning and ‘rushed’ the mechanic to the top of the ladder and ordered him on deck into fresh air. Gasking ordered ‘gas masks on’, and returned to the engine room with his gas mask on. But the smoke was extremely dense with what he believed to be ‘deadly gas’. His mask immediately choked him as he made a ‘great endeavor’ to get into the engine room but failed to do so, and found himself collapsing at the top of the ladder as he managed to drag himself out of the mess deck. The mess deck by that time, was filled with dense with smoke. He ordered ‘Stand by depth charges’, ‘Stand by to release depth charges’.
All hands including the coxswain assisted to see all depth charge pistols were set to safe and primers withdrawn, where upon the depth charges were released overboard. Gasking held the view, they were the ‘main menace to Balmoral and everywhere else’ if they were to explode. All of the depth charges were subsequently recovered by divers.
Having sufficiently recovered, the motor mechanic was ordered to shut off the petrol which he eventually achieved by the cocks at the aft tanks.
By his written statement, Gasking advised that during the first few minutes, the vessel was slipped from the buoy and every aperture into the engine room was sealed in an effort to contain the spread of fire. Steady Hour was ordered to tow her clear of the buoy at which time the diving boat Otter, arrived from HMAS Penguin with the intention of beaching her. But Gasking realised a ‘Fire Party’ was proceeding to the jetty at Penguin and order she be towed to the wharf. At the wharf she was attended by two fire brigade engines and crews and naval personnel, who extinguished the fire at 1020 (10.20 am). By that time, Silver Cloud was well down by the bow, having approximately two-thirds of her displacement of water pumped into her.
The fire brigade pumped water out of her and all salvageable stores were removed. By midday she had regained normal stability and Gasking was ordered to have her towed to Garden Island for examination.
Two of the crew were admitted to sick bay suffering from the effects of the gas. Two days after the fire, the commanding officer of Penguin issued the results of a survey of the hulk, ‘the hull has been so extensively damaged as to be beyond repair’ and, ‘the planking, timbers and stringers from the water line to the upper deck, from the forward bulkhead of the crew’s quarters to the after end of the engine room, about two thirds the length of the ship, has been destroyed’.
A Board of Inquiry was established which met on 16 July 1943 at the naval base of HMAS Kuttabul. Again, the members were formed by senior staff of the local Sydney command. As with the Board of Inquiry for the loss of Nereus, there were no investigation reports from experts and no fire experts were questioned. Three days later, the Board presented their report to Muirhead-Gould, still commander in charge of Sydney. During the examination, the Board questioned an officer of the NSW Fire Brigade who had attended and assisted to extinguish the fire. The Board asked if the Naval service respirators were effective against the gas produced by the carbon tetrachloride based extinguishers. The response was shocking, ‘not effective against the gas that is produced when carbon tetrachloride vaporizes. It is approximately five times heavier than the atmosphere. The Service type of respirator needs oxygen, and there is no oxygen in the atmosphere in these circumstances. You need some apparatus where the man has his own supply of oxygen’. He was asked ‘It is not protection because there is a lack of oxygen’ to which he responded ‘Yes Sir – owing to the heavy gravity of the carbon tetrachloride’. The Board failed to enquire why the Navy was using fire extinguishers that were incompatible with the supplied gas masks?
On 10 August 1943, Muirhead-Gould issued an updated ‘Confidential Memorandum’ titled ‘Prevention of Fire in Small Vessels’ but did not include commanding officers of small vessels on his distribution list. The Board found the fire was caused by the ‘flooding’ of the carburetor on the port engine and subsequent ignition of the escaping petrol by a ‘blow back’ through the carburetor owing to an inlet valve sticking up. The resulting small fire led to the melting of the die metal casting of the petrol pump which thus left an open ended petrol pipe through which petrol streamed by gravity from the aft petrol tanks. Had the petrol been isolated, the spread of the fire would have been prevented.
Muirhead-Gould reviewed the Board’s findings and reported to the Naval Board that ‘arrangements are now being made to fit a CO2 fire extinguishing system in CPB’s’ and he recommended that breathing apparatus with 40 feet (12.2m) of hose be supplied to the CPB’s. There is no evidence the matter was actioned.
On considering Muirhead-Gould’s report, the Naval Board found that Lieutenant Gasking, was considered blameworthy for not ensuring a person was in the engine room at the time the engines were started, did not shut off the petrol valves when he had an opportunity to do so and did not ensure the valves were shut off as soon as possible after the outbreak of fire. The Naval Board directed Gasking be informed accordingly.
But, despite the devastation from the fire, Silver Cloud had not reached the end of its life. By mid-August 1943, plans had been prepared to convert the remaining hulk into a ‘Store Vessel’, complete with a new engine room with twin 50hp diesel engines, 10 ton cargo hold in the aft section of the vessel complete with 10 ton derrick, and with a new wheel house and captain’s cabin.
A month later, Muirhead-Gould submitted a report to the Naval Board including a proposed cost of £5,700 for the work which he said could not be completed in less than four months, subject to the delivery of machinery. But Muirhead-Gould was of the opinion, that a ‘complete new boat with the same power and of more suitable form could be built for £200 to £300 over the cost of reconditioning’. Therefore, he said, it would appear desirable that Silver Cloud be offered for sale through the Contract Board.
By October 1943, a Compensation Board had finally been established, and lawyers acting for Bruce had lodged papers for his claim for compensation on just terms. At the time, Bruce was one of eleven owners including Harold Christmas for Toomeree, seeking a favourable determination from the Board.
Despite the Contract Board having disposed of the damaged engines, Halvorsens managed to find them and have them reconditioned. Halvorsens then set about the task of re-building Silver Cloud. During the rebuilding, Trygve Halvorsen left a portion of the burnt timber below her deck as a lasting ‘salute’ to her ‘wartime efforts’.
Freeman sold Silver Cloud in 1994 to Gary Rothwell. The following year, further refit work was undertaken and her MWM diesels were replaced with Cummins six-cylinder diesel engines. She starred in the 2004 movie ‘The Mystery of Natalie Wood’ as the yacht Splendour, from which Robert Wagner’s wife fell overboard and drowned in 1981.
Silver Cloud was sold again in 2005 to Robert and Lee Hunter. She was sailed to Port Macquarie where she was completely overhauled and restored between 2007 and 2010 before being displayed at the Australian National Maritime Museum for her ‘re-launching’ by Rear-Admiral Peter Sinclair on 19 March 2010.
423 The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 19 November 1938, p.8
424 The International Power Boat and Aquatic Monthly, April 1938
425 The International Power Boat and Aquatic Monthly, April 1938
426 Halvorsen Album Number 2, held by ANMM
427 NAA: MP138/1, 603/246/3100 – Motor yacht Silver Cloud. See Lloyds survey.
428 The International Power Boat and Aquatic Monthly, May 1939, p.54
429 ANMM - http://arhv.anmm.gov.au/en/objects/details/164185/
430 NAA: MP138/1, 603/246/3100 – Motor yacht Silver Cloud. This NAA Record includes the further details of requisition and purchase.
431 AWM 78, 418/1 - Sydney Log
432 NAA: SP338/1, 201/37 – (Japanese) Midget Submarine Attack on Sydney Harbour, May 31st June 1st 1942, p.1 and 2
433 RAN Sea Power Centre - Australia, Ship Index Cards
434 AWM Photograph 301992
435 Carruthers Collection, RAN Sea Power Centre - Australia. Letter from Reg Andrew dated 23 June 1978
436 Copies of this photo are held by the Sydney Harbour Fleet and the Sydney City Council Archives. Both are attributed to the Graeme Andrews Collection with the photographer cited as N Byrne. At the time Silver Cloud was destroyed, Byne was attached to HMAS Leewin in Western Australia. He could not have been the photographer. It is understood, this and similar photographs of the CPB’s and midget submarines in the Andrews Collection, most probably originated from the Naval Historical Collection, some of which form the photographic collection at the Australian War Memorial.
437 NAA: MP138/1, 603/246/3553: Motor launch Silver Cloud
438 NAA: MP138/1, 603/246/3100: Motor yacht Silver Cloud
439 NAA: MP138/1, 603/246/3553: Motor launch Silver Cloud
440 Despite reports in later publications, Silver Cloud was not ‘awaiting return to Jack Bruce’ at the time she was gutted by fire. See ANMM magazine, Signals No. 90, 2010, p.18
441 NAA: MP138/1, 603/246/3553: Motor launch Silver Cloud
442 NAA: MP138/1, 603/246/3553: Motor launch Silver Cloud
443 This recent history is based on Tony MacKay’s article in ANMM, Signals No. 90, 2010, p.16
444 Register of British Ships, Microfilm C2/16 held by ANMM, registration No. 343646, 14 in 1971
445 According to the Registration, Silver Cloud was acquired by Freeman on 26 February 1976
446 Photo courtesy ANMM
447 See ANMM - http://arhv.anmm.gov.au/en/objects/details/164185/, for further information.